must be made of Nietzschean ethics as a whole, and hence of the foundation on which Nietzsche builds his specific normative conclusions regarding compassion. The first section of this essay will therefore briefly stake out what I hope is a plausible position between those who deny that Nietzsche was engaged in anything resembling traditional ethical philosophy and those who see Nietzsche as nothing more than a rather heterodox Platonist or Aristotelian.
To be sure, my position in this first section must remain provisional, but my task is only to set the stage for an engagement with Nietzsche's alleged condemnation of compassion, which will take up the second, longer part of the essay. This latter section will show that an endorsement of one's compassion is actually a natural outgrowth of Nietzsche's immoralist ethics-that the noblest disciples of Zarathustra must actively embrace the sympathetic sentiments inevitably present in their own psyches. This interpretive claim should give pause to contemporary theorists who might seek to enlist Nietzsche as an obvious, unproblematic ally in their battle against the ubiquitous rhetoric of compassion today.
I. On Nietzschean Ethics
are tools by which the weak succeeded in poisoning the strong and healthy, robbing them of their natural strength and health. Luckily, however, this is "merely one type of human morality beside which other types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible" (JGB V:202, p.
305).
Nietzsche's demand for a new, higher morality can be harmonized with his perspectivism when one acknowledges, following Nehamas, that Nietzsche's perspectivism need not imply ethical relativism. 15 Specifically, perspectivism is entirely compatible with the idea that certain perspectives are better than others. Nietzsche captures this idea by rejecting interpretations of the world that represent "only provisional perspectives, perspectives… from some nook, perhaps from below, frog perspectives, as it were" (JGB I:2, p. 200). Nietzsche can even take this one step farther and consider that there might be one privileged perspective which is better, not just than some others, but better than all others-not in the sense of being more objective or giving a truer picture of things, but in the sense of being more urgent or more commanding. Such a perspective would be the single best perspective for human beings to take on the world; its view on existence would be ethically authoritative for creatures such as ourselves.
The interpretation of Nietzsche outlined in the previous section notwithstanding, it is impossible to deny that there are many strikingly relativist passages in Nietzsche's ethical writings which, even as they make use of the traditional concept of virtue, might be taken to prohibit us from considering any specific virtue the product of natural, Aristotelian teleology. 205). Thus, from the authoritative perspective of life, "esteeming itself is of all esteemed things the most estimable treasure." (Z I "On the Thousand and One Goals," p. 171). Nietzsche explains that life, as the will to power, is healthy insofar as it can successfully reach out and incorporate others into one's own projects. Yet violent coercion of an inferior can hardly achieve this goal;
"while a crude injury done him certainly demonstrates our power over him, it at the same time estranges his will from us even more-and thus makes him less easy to subjugate" (WM 769, pp.
403-404).
Only by legislating values, values which are then fully internalized by the wills of others, can one get around the futility of wielding more widely-recognized forms of great power.
Thus, Nietzsche writes, "he who determines values and directs the will of millennia by giving direction to the highest natures is the highest man" (WM 999, p. 519). The unthinking celebration of health and strength, of master morality, or even of value creation itself, is thus an evasion of man's highest responsibility and hence a sign of weakness. This is why Nietzsche writes that the strongest today are not found simply adhering to the oldfashioned morality of good and bad, as opposed to the now-common morality of good and evil.
Instead, "today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a "higher nature… than that of being… a genuine battleground of these opposed values" (GM I:16, p. 488). Nietzsche ultimately cannot tell those of us strong enough to choose our own values to choose one particular moral code. All he can do is describe the sort of choices characteristic of such noble individualschoices that shine forth as signs of their natural strength. Most obviously, the strong who have not been poisoned by slave morality or who have overcome this poisoning will normally tend to value themselves; value creation is at its most basic an act of self-affirmation. The naturally noble call the traits of character bound up with their psychic strength by the names of the virtues. 25 For a physician of the soul such as Nietzsche, these traits are best understood as diagnostic signs of psychic health; the positive self-evaluation of the strong themselves turns these positive symptoms into moral virtues.
The choices of the truly noble must remain fully their own and cannot be entirely predicted prior to any given act of value creation. This puts severe limitations on the ethicist's work as a physician of the soul. Nietzsche writes:
The popular medical formulation of morality that goes back to Ariston of Chios, "virtue is the health of the soul," would have to be changed to become useful, at least to read "your virtue is the health of your soul." For there is no health as such… Even the determination of what is healthy for your body depends on your goal, your horizon, your energies, your impulses… In one person, of course, this health could look like its opposite in another person (FW 3:120, pp. 176-177).
phenomena appear at one moment as signs of health, and, in an ever-so-subtly different form, as symptoms of weakness. There is a philosophical asceticism of which Nietzsche approves and a priestly one of which he does not; a skepticism which he condemns and another which he endorses; and, perhaps most famously, a pessimism of weakness and a pessimism of strength.
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We should not, then, expect a simple or straightforward categorization of the sympathetic sentiments.
To the contrary, we should expect to find closely related emotions in both categories:
a compassion of weakness endorsed by slave morality and a compassion of strength embraced by the natural aristocracy.
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II. The Case of Compassion
More Dangerous Than Any Vice
In discussing what can be translated into English alternately as "pity," "sympathy" or "compassion," Nietzsche almost always uses variations on the German term Mitleid-literally, "suffering-with"-and only rarely uses alternative German terms such as Mitempfinden, Mitgefühl (both "feeling-with") or Sympathie. Nietzsche was never entirely satisfied with the vocabulary available in German to describe the phenomenon in question-he complains "how coarsely does language assault with its one word [i.e., Mitleid] so polyphonous a being!"-but it is the vocabulary he uses nonetheless (MR 2:133, p. 133). The English word "compassion," from the Latin for "suffering with" (com-passion), or "sympathy" from the Greek for the same (sympathos), would be appropriate translations of Mitleid. In virtually all English-language translations of and commentaries on Nietzsche, however, variations on the term "pity" are chosen instead. 29 Yet "pity," which has an entirely different etymology, often carries negative connotations of superficiality and condescension which Mitleid lacks. defends those who have been disinherited and condemned by life" (AC 7, p. 573). 35 The eugenic argument against compassion is a direct extension of the medical nature of Nietzschean ethics.
"Life itself recognizes no solidarity, no 'equal rights,' between the healthy and the degenerate parts of an organism: one must excise the latter-or the whole will perish," Nietzsche explains.
As a result, "Compassion for [Mitleiden mit] decadents, equal rights for the ill-constituted-that would be the profoundest immorality; that would be antinature itself as morality!" (WM 734, p.
389). The physician to humanity, in order to save it from its degenerate parts, must therefore first play physician to the individual psyche, for it is the compassion in the individual that feeds the degeneracy in the collective. "To be physicians here, to wield the scalpel here," Nietzsche explains, "that is our part; that is our love of man; that is how we are philosophers" (AC 7, p.
574).
Even this eugenic view, however, fails to capture the full danger of compassion, for it portrays the weak and sickly who are its objects as mere passive recipients of aid. To the contrary, compassion is actively wielded as a weapon in the hands of the weak. For the most degenerate of the degenerate, it is the one weapon they have left, the one last strength which shows that they are still alive as manifestations of the will to power. They therefore wield compassion with relish. When the weak beg the strong for sympathy, "the compassion [Das Mitleiden] which these [the strong] then express is a consolation for the weak and suffering, inasmuch as it shows them that, all their weakness notwithstanding, they possess at any rate one power: the power to hurt" (MAM I:50, p. 39). The result is not only the objective degeneration of humanity over the generations, but also a subjective sense of shame on the part of those who remain strong. Full power over another, remember, is control over his values. The ultimate victory of the slaves over the masters thus comes when they have "succeeded in poisoning the consciences of the fortunate with their own misery, with all misery, so that one day the fortunate begin to be ashamed of their good fortune and perhaps say to one another: 'it is disgraceful to be fortunate: there is too much misery'" (GM III:14, p. 560).
According to Nietzsche, the recent development of Schopenhauer's Mitleids-Moral is evidence that slave morality is finally coming to self-consciousness, stripping itself of its theological underpinnings and realizing that it is founded on nothing more (or, for that matter, nothing less) than the coercive power of compassion, the one great weapon of the weak.
Mitleids-Moral hence has the advantage of a certain clear-headedness, a certain lack of illusions about itself not present in earlier (e.g., Christian) forms of slave morality. But it is slave morality all the same and, from the perspective of life, deserves the fiercest ethical opposition.
Compassion versus Compassion
Nietzsche is undoubtedly filled with rage at those who bring about the degeneration of One might answer in the negative, while finding some appropriately noble disposition that could perform an analogous function in the case of the strong and pitiless. Such a sentiment would lead the naturally healthy aristocrat to the service of a degenerating humanity without dragging him into the great cesspool of human suffering. To the contrary, it would grow naturally from the very health and power which keeps the nobleman at such a distance from his miserable inferiors. If Nietzsche, at times, still speaks of this sentiment as a sort of compassion, he is using the word very loosely, and primarily for ironic effect. And the best candidate for such a noble replacement for compassion is the "gift-giving virtue" discussed throughout Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. In the prologue of that epic work, our hero at first tells the saint that he has left his 
A Weakness of the Strong?
Our interpretive puzzle becomes especially salient when one focuses on Nietzsche's pseudo-scriptural epic Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Generally speaking, the eponymous hero of that work is a paragon of strength and health. Yet Zarathustra shamefacedly admits quite early on that he is unable to live up to his own vital ethics in one crucial regard. "If I must be compassionate Compassion may be a weakness, but it is a distinctive sentiment of the otherwise relatively strong. To be subject to infection by another's suffering one's own condition must initially be superior to his, so a feeling of compassion signals that one ranks higher than this suffering other. Although the degenerating effect of sympathetic suffering may soon drag one down to the sufferer's lowly condition, we must not discount the vitalizing effect of the initial realization of one's superiority. And it is precisely because those at risk of experiencing compassion are relatively strong that this emotion is such a powerful weapon in the hands of their inferiors. The "Jesuitism of mediocrity, which instinctively works at the annihilation of the uncommon man and tries to break every bent bow, or, preferably, to unbend it" is armed exclusively with this sentiment. "Unbending with familiar compassion, that is the characteristic art of Jesuitism which has always known how to introduce itself as a religion of compassion [des Mitleidens]" (JGB VI: 206, p. 316). Compassion is thus the weapon such Jesuits use in their attempt to destroy Zarathustra, whose Achilles' heel is his soft heart.
Nietzsche realizes these implications of his analysis, but is also quick to deflate them. A true compassion of strength would not be the distinctive symptom of the imminent demise of the once strong, but an expression of life and power successfully at work in the very moment of compassion.
Knowledge, Suffering and Strength of Imagination
That a true compassion of strength may indeed exist is suggested by the vital category of the Dionysian-a category that, though its contents are fluid and often obscure, Nietzsche clearly endorses wholeheartedly. In his earliest work, still largely under the spell of Schopenhauer, It is a strange form of delight, however, which shakes one by the sight of suffering and brings one to tears. Such tears look suspiciously like the sharing of suffering, a sharing essential to real knowledge of another's woe. Admittedly, philosophers today still speak of an empathetic sadism that delights in the suffering of another, not because it lacks full knowledge or experience of this suffering, or even despite such knowledge, but precisely through its sweet savor. Indeed, the initial observation of such cruel empathy is even credited to Nietzsche himself. 39 Sadistic empathy, however, seems unable to truly access the sufferings of others, entirely numb as it is to their pain's very painfulness. As Rousseau says of another's suffering, "to see it without feeling it is not to know it." 40 The truth of another's pain thus seems epistemologically inaccessible without an experience that itself qualifies as suffering, and hence as Mitleid or compassion.
To be sure, compassion as we actually experience it does not itself always get things right. The pain of another can be misfelt and hence misunderstood. Yet any emotion which does successfully accesses another's suffering will surely qualify as compassion. Indeed, the more accurate a picture of another's suffering a sentiment provides, the more fully does it deserve the name of compassion. "What Nietzsche names with… other names," Staten reasons, "is therefore 
Compassion as Test
Although Nietzsche acknowledges that the truly knowledgeable must also be compassionate, he is also famous for arguing that the truth is often of only dubious advantage to life. It is thus not clear that the knowledge that compassion brings is worth having, at least from the perspective of life. In evaluating compassion, Nietzsche is thus faced with a paradox: Insofar as a man has great strength of imagination and intellect, he will accurately feel the sufferings of others. Yet insofar as a man feels the sufferings of others, he may turn against his life and health.
Weakened by his compassion, he may even be brought down to the level of those whose sufferings he witnesses. In this way, "compassion [Mitleiden] is the deepest abyss: as deeply as man sees into life, he also sees into suffering" (Z III: "On the Vision and the Riddle," 1, pp. 269).
The paradox is especially pressing for someone who seeks knowledge of that specific form of human suffering that Nietzsche describes as the object of his greatest interest: the degeneration of humanity and of its highest specimens. "The more a psychologist-a born and inevitable psychologist and unriddler of souls-applies himself to the more exquisite cases and human beings," Nietzsche writes, "the greater becomes the danger that he might suffocate from This problem is solved when we understand the Mitleid inevitably faced by the imaginative unriddler of human souls as a test of strength akin to the Leiden Nietzsche wishes for his disciples. Just as the ability to withstand personal suffering is crucial for establishing an individual's true rank, so too could one "determine value and rank in accordance with how much and how many things one could bear to take upon oneself, how far one could extend one's responsibility" (JGB VI:212, p. 327) with regard to the suffering of others. In this way, the lifepromoting aspect in compassion, as Nietzsche puts it with regard to his own case, "does not consist in feeling with [mitzufühlen] men how they are, but in enduring that I feel with them"
(EH "Why I Am So Wise" 8, p. 689). If compassion is indeed inseparable from a certain kind of knowledge-knowledge of the truth of others' suffering-then the test of compassion is part of a larger series of trials through which the noble philosopher must pass. "How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth does it dare? More and more that became for me the real measure of value" Nietzsche writes. "Error… is not blindness; error is cowardice" (EH Preface 3, p. 674).
The challenge regarding the specific truth of others' suffering is to feel compassion for them, and to feel it with full force, but "not to remain stuck" to it (JGB II:41, p. 242). Mitgefühl is thus included alongside courage, insight and solitude as one of the four virtues which a noble man must "master"-not only in the sense of possessing these virtues, but also in the sense of At one point in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche presents a vivid portrait of the selfloving, self-disciplined nobleman, the man for whom (and only for whom) there can be a genuine compassion of strength:
A man who says, "I like this, I take this for my own and want to protect it and defend it against anybody;" a man who is able to manage something, to carry out a resolution, to remain faithful to a thought, to hold a woman, to punish and prostrate one who presumed too much; a man who has his wrath and his sword and to whom the weak, the suffering, the hard pressed, and the animals like to fall and belong by nature, in short a man who is by nature a master-when such a man has compassion [Mitleiden], well, this compassion has value [dies Mitledien hat Wert]" (JGB IX:293, p. 420).
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As vivid as it is, however, this is a rather odd and incomplete portrait. How exactly does such a nobleman, naturally a master of others, come to master himself and his own compassion, hence giving it value? Certainly not by purging the emotion from his psyche entirely, for then one cannot say that the natural master still "has" compassion, and that this compassion "has"
value. Fortunately, Nietzsche provides another, fuller portrait of a great man wrestling with his own compassion: the title character in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, who is simultaneously the imperfect embodiment of Nietzsche's ethical ideal and the author's alter ego. Upon examination, the figure of Zarathustra implies a rather different approach to shared suffering than "the overcoming of compassion" might suggest.
Zarathustra's Ultimate Triumph
"As 'Zarathustra's temptation,'" Nietzsche recounts, "I invented a situation in which a great cry of distress reaches him, as compassion [das Mitleiden] tries to attack him as a final sin that would entice him away from himself" (EH "Why I Am So Wise" 4, p. 684). 44 This temptation takes center stage in the final quarter of the work, with a soothsayer's explicit announcement that compassion has been "saved up" for our protagonist as his last great vice (Z IV "The Cry of Distress, p. 354). "To remain the master at this point," Nietzsche explains, "to keep the eminence of one's task undefiled… that is the test, perhaps the ultimate test, which a Zarathustra must pass-his real proof of strength" (EH "Why I Am So Wise" 4, p. 684).
Nietzsche's hero is thus sent off for a trying and terrible day of encounters with the "higher men," precisely the sort of near-misses which are so likely to choke a psychologist with compassion. Compassion naturally poses the greatest test for the strong with regard to this most painful of all forms of the emotion, compassion "for higher men into whose rare torture and helplessness some accident allowed us to look" (JGB II:41, p. 242).
Though each higher man deserves full attention, representing as they do the ripest fruit of Nietzsche's studies of the almost-great, for our purposes we must focus instead on Zarathustra's reaction to them. And of all the emotions toward the higher men that Zarathustra struggles to master, perhaps most interesting are those from his encounter with the "ugliest man." Even as this grotesque figure is about to praise Zarathustra for his relative lack of compassion-a sign of natural strength so radically different from the weakness of the pitying, pitiful mob, who madly call their compassion "virtue itself"-our hero falls prey to precisely such vulgar feelings.
Zarathustra experiences compassion like a blow from a great enemy, described with an What, exactly, constitutes this revitalizing victory? Inspired by the passage in Ecce Homo which insists that Zarathustra must "overcome" compassion in order to carry on the hard work of creation, Martha Nussbaum interprets the "climax" of Zarathustra's "long spiritual development"
as coming only when "he finally gets rid of his pity." 45 Stanley Rosen agrees, arguing that in this moment of "purgation" Zarathustra is finally "cured of pity for the higher men." 46 Robert Pippin specifically sees the "sign" of the lion's appearance (symbolic of strength) as persuading Zarathustra that he is at last free of any sympathetic feelings for these specimens of failed greatness. With this sign, Zarathustra makes a "mysterious, sudden decision that he no longer pities them." 47 This conventional interpretation of the close of Nietzsche's epic, however, is surely incorrect. A close examination of the passage in question reveals that Zarathustra never "overcomes" his compassion in the sense of ridding himself of it once and for all. There is no indication that our hero will fail to experience compassion upon further encounters with suffering, or even that he has ceased to feel compassion for the higher men. Achieving "mastery" over a virtue or sentiment, remember, necessarily implies retaining it in one's psyche, not abandoning it. Rather than ridding himself of all sympathetic sentiments once and for all, Zarathustra affirms his feelings for the higher men as having had their "time" as an essential component of his destiny. Compassion may cause him real misery, but, when properly harnessed, it helps rather than hinders Zarathustra's creativity. Indeed, as tightly bound as sympathetic feelings are with the possession of knowledge and the faculty of imagination, they are necessarily present in any creative psyche. Remembering, then, that the telos of human striving is not happiness but creation (more specifically value-creation), the experience of compassion is nothing to be regretted.
While Rosen acknowledges that "the pitiful must be accepted as a natural part of human existence," he nonetheless interprets Nietzsche to maintain that "it must also be destroyed in order for the creation of higher values that will themselves exclude or minimize pity by the imposition of a natural hardness that… is for Nietzsche the indispensable complement to the birth of a race of warrior-artists." 48 Yet value-creation does not require the "destruction" of compassion; it requires affirmation of the imaginative strength which allows the wise to share suffering with the objects of their all-encompassing knowledge. A mere brute warrior may not need to experience compassion, but a warrior-artist and value-creator surely must, albeit without allowing this suffering to interfere with his work. Though the weak may be unable to withstand even the slightest pain, the strong and creative not only withstand their suffering and their sympathetic suffering-they positively embrace them. Such suffering is of no "matter" to them, for it is no hindrance in their creative task, only a hindrance to the pursuit of happiness undertaken by the "last man" and other such degenerates (See Z I Prologue 5, p. 129).
Compassion, Zarathustra concludes, is an unbearable burden only for those who mistakenly believe the true goal of human existence to be contentment rather than creation.
Elsewhere, speaking of his philosophical honesty, Nietzsche reasons that, despite this honesty's regrettable aspects, "supposing that this is our virtue from which we cannot get away, we free spirits-well, let us work on it with all our malice and love and not weary of 'perfecting' ourselves in our virtue" (JGB VII:227, p. 345). 49 Zarathustra treats compassion similarly, realizing that sympathetic suffering is inseparable from his imaginative creativity, and then returning to his destined task with the glow of a healthy soul ready to use all his facultiesincluding compassionate imagination-in pursuit of his chosen task. 50 This, remember, is how value-creation first appears, as a great self-affirmation on the part of the naturally noble (See GM I:2, p. 462). Such a value-creator seizes the right to call even his propensities for sufferingincluding a propensity for the sympathetic suffering of Mitleid-by the name of virtue. The virtue so chosen will inevitably shine forth as a sign of his strength, and be put to service in the advancement of life.
Nietzsche's Warning
Though my interpretation of Nietzsche's position on compassion may be unconventional, the conviction that Nietzsche's position remains relevant is not. Many, such as Nussbaum, have
defended compassion against what they see as Nietzsche's unrelenting critique; by refuting him, they hope to better understand our reasons for embracing the sentiment today. 51 Yet the temptation here is to misinterpret Nietzsche so as to render him easier dialectical prey.
Nussbaum's critic Weber, though sharing Nussbaum's misreading of Nietzsche as a straightforward opponent of compassion, moves closer to a true understanding of Nietzsche's position by considering that it might be basically correct. "In a world in which so many suffer while a small minority flourishes," Weber acknowledges, "it is easy to invest all one's energy… into the plight of those who suffer, and to lose sight of-perhaps even to develop a certain contempt for-the more privileged and… the realization of the highest human excellences."
he remains convinced that Nietzsche's description of "the pitfalls and pathologies" of the sympathetic sentiments serves as a "good warning" for all those who might overvalue these emotions. 53 Weber, however, only captures half of Nietzsche's warning. There is a second way in which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but we also risk developing contempt for the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts.
Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows' plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge for ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for creative achievement.
By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet or psychologist-the born and inevitable unriddler of human souls-could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life, and against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful horse being beaten by its driver. 58 In this way, Nietzsche might not only pronounce a warning about the life-denying dangers of excessive opposition to compassion; he might also serve as such a warning himself.
Nietzsche was well aware that his general approach to ethics, together with his insightful evaluation of Mitleid, demanded that the noble soul embrace its own sympathetic sentiments. Yet
Nietzsche was also aware that every great philosophy is "the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir" (JGB I:6, p. 203). Perhaps the greatest sin that Nietzsche confesses in his philosophy is a failure to make peace with a world filled with misery in which knowledge of the human condition is inseparable from compassionate suffering.
Since his fierce denunciations of the undue celebration of compassion so overwhelmingly outnumber his denunciations of its undue rejection, Nietzsche appears to be a much more straightforward critic of shared suffering than his immoralist ethics warrants. 59 Although Nietzsche may have lacked the fortitude to endure the pain of his tremendous compassion for others, this very compassion animated his greatest creative achievements, most notably the fourth part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The moving portraits of the higher men-not to mention the compelling account of Zarathustra's long struggle to endure and ultimately embrace his sympathetic feelings for them-would have been impossible had the author lacked deep compassion for each and every one of his characters, as well as for their real-world models.
Yet even as Thus Spoke Zarathustra remains an eloquent example of the creative achievements possible only through compassion, the anguish which allowed for its composition may have been too much for its author to bear. 29 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "pity" from the Latin, "pietas," which originally meant only "piety" and came to take on the secondary meaning of "pity" in the late medieval period. 
Notes
